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Abstract : We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented
by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can
use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a payoﬀ from interaction with all
their immediate neighbors. We consider three diﬀerent update rules, called
‘birth-death’, ‘death-birth’ and ‘imitation’. A fourth update rule, ‘pairwise
comparison’, is shown to be equivalent to birth-death updating in our model.
We use pair-approximation to describe the evolutionary game dynamics on
regular graphs of degree k. In the limit of weak selection, we can derive a
diﬀerential equation which describes how the average frequency of each strat-
egy on the graph changes over time. Remarkably, this equation is a replicator
equation with a transformed payoﬀ matrix. Therefore, moving a game from
a well-mixed population (the complete graph) onto a regular graph simply
results in a transformation of the payoﬀ matrix. The new payoﬀ matrix is
the sum of the original payoﬀ matrix plus another matrix, which describes
the local competition of strategies. We discuss the application of our theory
to four particular examples, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snow-Drift game, a
coordination game and the Rock-Scissors-Paper game.
Keywords: evolutionary dynamics, game theory, evolutionary graph theory, pair approx-
imation, mathematical biology
11. Introduction
Consider an evolutionary game with n strategies, labelled i = 1,..,n. The payoﬀ matrix, A,
is an n£n matrix, whose entries, aij, denote the payoﬀ for strategy i versus strategy j. The
relative abundance (frequency) of each strategy is given by xi. We have
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. The
ﬁtness of strategy i is given by fi =
∑n
j=1 xjaij. For the average ﬁtness of the population,
we obtain φ =
∑n
i=1 xifi. The replicator equation is given by
˙ xi = xi(fi ¡ φ) i = 1,..,n (1)
This equation is one of the fundamental equations of evolutionary dynamics. It describes
evolutionary game dynamics (=frequency dependent selection) in the deterministic limit
of an inﬁnitely large, well-mixed population. Stochasticity and spatial eﬀects are ignored.
‘Well-mixed’ means that population structure is ignored; all individuals are equally likely
to interact with each other.
The replicator equation is deﬁned on the simplex Sn, which is given by the set of
all points (x1,..,xn) with the property
∑n
i=1 xi = 1. The simplex Sn is invariant under
replicator dynamics: a trajectory which begins in the simplex, never leaves the simplex.
Each face of the simplex, deﬁned by one or several startegies being absent, is invariant.
The replicator equation describes pure selection dynamics. Mutation is not considered.
Each corner point of the simplex is an equilibrium. If a strategy is evolutionarily stable
or a strict Nash equilibrium, then the corner point of the simplex corresponding to a
homogeneous population using this strategy is an asymptotically stable ﬁxed point. There
can be at most one isolated equilibrium point in the interior of the simplex. For n ¸ 4,
if there is an interior equilibrium, there can also be a limit cycle or a chaotic attractor.
Many more properties of this system and the relationship to Lotka-Volterra equations of
ecology are descibed in the book by Hofbauer & Sigmund (1998). The replicator equation
was introduced by Taylor & Jonker (1978), followed by Hofbauer et al (1979) and Zeeman
(1980). Evolutionary game theory was invented by Maynard Smith & Price (1973) and
Maynard Smith (1982). For recent reviews see Hofbauer & Sigmund (2003) and Nowak &
Sigmund (2004). Books on game theory and evolutionary game theory include Fudenberg
& Tirole (1991), Binmore (1994), Weibull (1995), Samuelson (1997), Fudenberg & Levine
(1998), Hofbauer & Sigmund (1998), Gintis (2000), and Cressman (2003).
2In this paper, we study evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations
(Nowak & May 1992, 1993, Ellison 1993, Herz 1994, Lindgren & Nordahl 1994, Nowak
et al 1994, Killingback & Doebeli 1996, Nakamaru et al 1997, 1998, Epstein 1998, Szab´ o &
T˝ oke 1998, Van Baalen & Rand 1998, Watts & Strogatz 1998, Eshel et al 1999, Hartvigsen
et al 2000, Page et al 2000, Szab´ o et al 2000, Skyrms & Pemantle 2000, Abramson &
Kuperman 2001, Hauert 2001, Irwin & Taylor 2001, Ebel & Bornholdt 2002, Hauert et al
2002, Szab´ o & Hauert 2002, Brandt et al 2003, Le Galliard et al 2003, Hauert & Szab´ o
2003, Hauert & Doebeli 2004, Ifti et al 2004, Szab´ o & Vukov 2004, Szolnoki & Szab´ o 2004,
Egu´ ıluz et al 2005, Hauert 2005, Nakamaru & Iwasa 2005, Santos & Pacheco 2005, Vukov &
Szab´ o 2005, Santos et al 2006ab). The individuals occupy the vertices of a graph; the edges
of the graph determine which individuals interact with each other (Lieberman et al 2005,
Ohtsuki et al 2006). We consider n strategies and the general payoﬀ matrix A = [aij]. Each
individual derives a payoﬀ, P, from the interaction with all of its neighbours in the graph.
The ﬁtness of an individual is given by 1¡w+wP, where the parameter w determines the
intensity of selection. The case w ! 0 represents the limit of weak selection, while w = 1
denotes strong selection, where ﬁtness equals payoﬀ. Strong selection is a special case,
because in general the ﬁtness of an individual will not only depend on the particular game
that is under consideration, but on many diﬀerent factors (Nowak et al 2004). Therefore,
introducing a parameter for varying the intensity of selection is an important step, which
was never taken in the traditional framework of the replicator equation, because there w
cancels out.
In games on graphs, the ﬁtness of an individual is locally determined from interac-
tions with all adjacent individuals. The traditional replicator equation (1) describes the
special case of a ‘complete graph’, where all vertices are connected to each other and hence
all individuals are adjacent.
We consider three diﬀerent update rules for the evolutionary dynamics (Fig 1a-
c), which we call ‘birth-death’ (BD), ‘death-birth’ (DB) and ‘imitation’ (IM). (i) For BD
updating, an individual is selected for reproduction from the entire population proportional
to ﬁtness; the oﬀspring of this individual replaces a randomly chosen neighbor. (ii) For DB
updating, a random individual from the entire population is chosen to die; the neighbors
compete for the empty site proportional to ﬁtness. (iii) For IM updating, a random
3individual from the entire population is chosen to revise its strategy; it will either keep
its current strategy or imitate one of the neighbors’ strategies proportional to ﬁtness.
Note that our imitation updating is diﬀerent from the ‘imitation dynamics’ introduced
by Weibull (1995) and Hofbauer & Sigmund (2003), which describe deterministic game
dynamics in a well-mixed population, where random pairs of players compare their payoﬀs
and possibly imitate the strategy of the other.
These three update rules deﬁne three slightly diﬀerent stochastic processes. In each
process, one elementary step involves two random choices, one of them is proportional to
ﬁtness. For BD updating the ﬁrst choice is proportional to ﬁtness, for DB and IM updating
the second choice is proportional to ﬁtness. We will ﬁnd that this detail can introduce
interesting diﬀerences.
In the Appendix, we also consider a fourth update rule called ‘pairwise comparison’
(PC) (Fig 1d). Here one player is chosen at random, then one of its neighbors is chosen.
The ﬁrst individual will adopt the strategy of the second indvidual with a probability that is
given by 1/[1+exp(¡w∆P)] where the payoﬀ diﬀerence is ∆P = P2¡P1. Interestingly, this
update rule leads to the same behavior as BD updating in our current analysis. Therefore,
we do not need to consider it as an additional case.
Games on graphs are stochastic, while the replicator equation is deterministic. Re-
cently Traulsen et al (2005, 2006a) have found that the Moran process in a well-mixed
population lead to the deterministic equation that is called adjusted replicator dynamics.
What we want to do in this paper is to derive a system of ordinary diﬀerential equations
that describes how the expected frequency of each strategy in a game on a graph changes
over time. We will use pair-approximation (Matsuda et al 1987, 1992, Van Baalen 2000) on
regular graphs of degree k (Ohtsuki et al 2006). This means each individual is connected
to k other individuals. Strictly speaking pair-approximation is formulated for inﬁnitely
large Bethe lattices (or Caily trees) which have no loops and no leaves. It is well known,
however, that pair-approximation gives good results for random regular graphs; as the
number of vertices, N, increases the probability of short loops becomes negligible. As we
will point out below our calculation requires k > 2. For an analysis of k = 2 see Ohtsuki
& Nowak (2006).
Let us introduce the n£n matrix B = [bij] for the three diﬀerent update mechanisms
4as follows:
BD: bij =
aii + aij ¡ aji ¡ ajj
k ¡ 2
DB: bij =
(k + 1)aii + aij ¡ aji ¡ (k + 1)ajj
(k + 1)(k ¡ 2)
IM: bij =
(k + 3)aii + 3aij ¡ 3aji ¡ (k + 3)ajj
(k + 3)(k ¡ 2)
(2)
Let us further introduce the quantities
gi =
n ∑
i=1
xjbij. (3)
If xi(t) is the expected frequency of strategy i on an inﬁnitely large graph of degree k at
time t, then our pair-approximation calculation in the limit of weak selection leads to the
surprisingly simple equation
˙ xi = xi(fi + gi ¡ φ) i = 1,..,n (4)
We propose to call this equation the ‘replicator equation on graphs’. It describes how the
expected frequencies of strategies on a graph of degree k > 2 change over time. The sim-
plicity and symmetry of this equation is remarkable given the complexity of the underlying
stochastic process that describes games on graphs.
The term fi =
∑n
j=1 xjaij denotes the average ﬁtness of strategy i, as in the
replicator equation, and comes from well-mixed interactions among all strategies. The
additional term, gi, characterizes the local competition among strategies. Note that the
population average of the local competition term sums to zero,
n ∑
i=1
xigi = 0. (5)
Therefore the average ﬁtness of the population, φ =
∑n
i=1 xi(fi+gi) =
∑n
i=1 xifi, remains
the same as in the replicator equation.
As seen in eqs (2), the term for local competition, bij, includes the payoﬀ that
strategy i gets from strategy i plus the payoﬀ that strategy i gets from strategy j minus
the payoﬀ that j gets from i minus the payoﬀ that j gets from j. The diagonal terms, aii
5and ajj, characterize the eﬀect of assortativeness, while the oﬀ-diagonal terms, aij and aji,
characterize the eﬀect of spite. Note that the matrix (bij) is antisymmetric, i.e. bij = ¡bji.
This makes sense, because the gain of one strategy in local competitiveness is the loss of
another. In particular the diagonal terms bii are always zero, suggesting that the payoﬀ
for one strategy playing against others using the same strategy will always be the same
irrespective of population structure.
In a structured population, it is especially important which payoﬀ players get when
interacting with another player who uses the same strategy (assortativeness) and also which
payoﬀ strategies provide to others with whom they are in direct competition (spite). As
in eqs (2), for BD updating the contributions from assortativeness and spite are equally
strong, while for DB updating assortativeness is stronger than spite (the coeﬃcients for
assortativeness in eqs (2) have relative weight k + 1). IM updating has a balance of
assortativeness and spite that is somewhere between BD and DB updating.
For a zero sum game, which can be deﬁned by aii = 0 and aij = ¡aji for all
i and j, we ﬁnd that bij is equal to aij times a constant. Therfore, the graph has no
consequence for the evolutionary dynamics (other than aﬀecting the time scale). For pair
approximation and weak selection, a zero sum game on a regular graph has the same
evolutionary dynamics as in a well-mixed population.
Observe also as k increases the relative contribution of gi compared to fi decreases.
In the limit k ! 1, eq (4) leads back to eq (1), the replicator equation on a highly
connected graph converges to the normal replicator equation, which agrees with the result
by Traulsen et al (2006a) for weak selection.
Finally, we note that the replicator equation on graphs can also be written in the
form
˙ xi = xi[
n ∑
j=1
xj(aij + bij) ¡ φ]. (6)
Therefore, moving evolutionary game dynamics from a well mixed population (the complete
graph) onto a regular graph of degree k is simply described by a transformation of the payoﬀ
matrix
[aij] ! [aij + bij]. (7)
Our results will be derived for degree homogeneous (=regular) graphs and weak
selection, but we expect that the replicator equation on graphs is also a good approximation
6for many games on non-regular graphs and for higher intensity of selection. In any case, an
exact understanding of the limiting scenario is a good point of departure for investigations
of more complicated and more speciﬁc scenarios.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2,3 and 4, we will show the pair-
approximation calculations for BD, DB and IM updating, respectively. In Section 5, we will
study the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and in Section 6 the Snow-drift game, where we investigate
the eﬀect of spatiality on the evolution of cooperation. In Section 7 we will study a
coordination game to see the possibility whether local population structure favors eﬃcient
outcomes for groups through individual selection. In Section 8 we will study the Rock-
Scissors-Paper game to investigate spatial eﬀect on evolutionary cycles. Section 9 contains
conclusions. There is a short Appendix showing the equivalence between PC and BD
updating.
2. Birth-death (BD) updating
For BD updating, a player is chosen for reproduction from the entire population propor-
tional to ﬁtness. The oﬀspring of this player replaces a random neighbor. In this section,
we will derive the replicator equation for games on graphs with BD updating, assuming
weak selection w ¿ 1.
In a well-mixed population, the probability that a player meets an i-strategist is
equal to its global frequency, xi. For games on graphs, however, this is not necessarily
true. Since dispersal is limited, those who use the same strategy tend to form clusters.
Therefore, we have to take into account the correlation in strategies of two adjacent players.
Let qijj be the conditional probability that the focal player uses strategy i given that
an adjacent player uses strategy j. In other words, qijj is the local frequency of strategy
i around strategy j. The local frequency qijj is expressed by the global frequencies of
strategies as qijj = xij/xj. Here xij denotes the global pair-frequency of i-j pairs.
Similarly one can imagine more detailed local frequencies such as qijjl, which repre-
sents the conditional probability that the focal player uses strategy i given that an adjacent
player uses strategy j and that a two-step adjacent player uses strategy l. For analyti-
cal tractability, we will adopt the pair approximation method (Matsuda et al 1987, 1992,
Van Baalen 2000), which assumes qijjl = qijj. The crucial assumption is that a two-step
adjacent player does not aﬀect the focal site directly.
7We are interested in the dynamics of global and local frequencies. Because we
consider weak selection, global frequencies change at a rate of order w, which is very slow.
Local frequencies change at a rate of order 1. Therefore, we have a separation of two time
scales.
Let us ﬁrst derive local frequencies at equilibrium. While local frequencies equili-
brate, we can regard global frequencies as constant. Suppose that a player is chosen for
reproduction on average once per unit time. Then the dynamics of local frequencies are
calculated as follows
˙ qijj =
˙ xij
xj
=
2
k
[
δij + (k ¡ 1)
(∑
l
qijlqljj
)
¡ kqijj
]
+ O(w). (8)
Here δij is the Kronecker delta; δij = 1 if i = j, otherwise it is 0. From eq (8) and by
using the identity qijjxj = qjjixi equilibrium local frequencies are calculated as
q¤
ijj =
(k ¡ 2)xi + δij
k ¡ 1
. (9)
We see that q¤
iji > xi > q¤
ijj (j 6= i) holds. Players using strategy i have more i-neighbors
than is expected by the global frequency, while players using another strategy have less
i-neighbors than is expected.
Given these local frequencies, we can derive the dynamics of global frequencies. For
convenience we rewrite q¤
ijj as qijj. We invent the term ‘(i;k1,¢¢¢,kn)-player’ denoting a
player using strategy i who has k1 neighbors with strategy 1, ¢¢¢, and kn neighbors with
strategy n.
Let us now consider one elementary step of BD updating.
The number of i-strategists increases by one, when (i) an (i;k1,¢¢¢,kn)-player is
chosen for reproduction and (ii) the oﬀspring replaces a neighbor who does not use strategy
i. The ﬁrst event occurs with probability
[
xi ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1ji ¢¢¢q
kn
nji
)
¢ W(i;k1,¢¢¢kn)
]/
¯ W. (10)
Here W(i;k1,¢¢¢kn) denotes the ﬁtness of an (i;k1,¢¢¢kn)-player, which is given by
W(i;k1,¢¢¢kn) = 1 ¡ w + w ¢
(∑
l
klail
)
. (11)
8¯ W is the average ﬁtness in the population. The second event occurs with probability
1 ¡ (ki/k).
In contrast, the number of i-strategists decreases by one when (i) an (j;k1,¢¢¢,kn)-
player (j 6= i) is chosen for reproduction and (ii) the oﬀspring replaces an i-player. The
ﬁrst event occurs with probability
[
xj ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1jj ¢¢¢q
kn
njj
)
¢ W(j;k1,¢¢¢kn)
]/
¯ W. (12)
The second event occurs with probability ki/k.
From these calculations we obtain the expected increment of the frequency of strat-
egy i, denoted by E[∆xi], in one elementary step of updating, which takes time ∆t. In
inﬁnite populations stochasticity resulting from random sampling vanishes and the quantity
E[∆xi]/∆t becomes equal to ˙ xi. Thus we obtain the deterministic evolutionary dynamics
˙ xi =
E[∆xi]
∆t
=
∑
k1+¢¢¢+kn=k
[
xi ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1ji ¢¢¢q
kn
nji
)
¢ W(i;k1,¢¢¢kn)
]
¢
(
1 ¡
ki
k
)/
¯ W
¡
∑
k1+¢¢¢+kn=k
j6=i
[
xj ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1jj ¢¢¢q
kn
njj
)
¢ W(j;k1,¢¢¢kn)
]
¢
ki
k
/
¯ W
¼ w
(k ¡ 2)2
k ¡ 1
¢ xi(fi + gi ¡ φ).
(13)
We have
fi =
∑
j
xjaij
φ =
∑
i
xifi =
∑
i,j
xixjaij
gi =
∑
j
xjbij
bij =
aii + aij ¡ aji ¡ ajj
k ¡ 2
.
(14)
Neglecting the constant factor, w(k ¡ 2)2/(k ¡ 1), which is equivalent to a change of time
scale, gives us the replicator equation on graphs,
˙ xi = xi(fi + gi ¡ φ). (15)
93. Death-birth (DB) updating
For DB updating, a random player is chosen from the entire population to die. Then the
neighbors compete for the vacancy proportional to their ﬁtness. Again, we will derive the
replicator equation for games on graphs using DB updating and assuming weak selection
w ¿ 1.
First we derive the steady state of the local frequencies. Direct calculation shows
that the dynamics of local frequencies are exactly the same as eq (8). Hence, the local
frequencies converge to
qijj =
(k ¡ 2)xi + δij
k ¡ 1
. (16)
Next we study the dynamics of global frequencies. Let us consider one elementary
step of DB updating.
The number of i-strategists increases by one when (i) an (j;k1,¢¢¢,kn)-player (j 6= i)
dies and (ii) one of its i-neighbors wins the competition for the vacancy. The ﬁrst event
occurs with probability
xj ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1jj ¢¢¢q
kn
njj
)
. (17)
The second event occurs with probability
kiWijj ∑
l klWljj
. (18)
Here Wijj represents the ﬁtness of an i-player one of whose neighbors is j-player, given as
Wijj = 1 ¡ w + w ¢
(
aij +
∑
l
(k ¡ 1)qljiail
)
. (19)
In contrast, the number of i-strategists decreases by one, when (i) an (i;k1,¢¢¢,kn)-
player dies and (ii) one of its neighbors not using strategy i wins the competition for the
vacancy. The ﬁrst event occurs with probability
xi ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1ji ¢¢¢q
kn
nji
)
. (20)
The second event occurs with probability
1 ¡
kiWiji ∑
l klWlji
. (21)
10From these calculations we obtain
˙ xi =
∑
k1+¢¢¢+kn=k
j6=i
xj ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1jj ¢¢¢q
kn
njj
)
¢
kiWijj ∑
l klWljj
¡
∑
k1+¢¢¢+kn=k
xi ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1ji ¢¢¢q
kn
nji
)
¢
(
1 ¡
kiWiji ∑
l klWlji
)
¼ w
(k + 1)(k ¡ 2)2
k(k ¡ 1)
¢ xi(fi + gi ¡ φ).
(22)
We have
fi =
∑
j
xjaij
φ =
∑
i
xifi =
∑
i,j
xixjaij
gi =
∑
j
xjbij
bij =
(k + 1)aii + aij ¡ aji ¡ (k + 1)ajj
(k + 1)(k ¡ 2)
.
(23)
Again, neglecting the constant factor yields the replicator equation on graphs,
˙ xi = xi(fi + gi ¡ φ). (24)
4. Imitation (IM) updating
For IM updating, a random player is chosen for updating his strategy from the entire
population. Then he will either keep his current strategy or imitate one of the neighbors’
strategies proportional to ﬁtness. As before, we assume weak selection w ¿ 1.
First we derive the steady state of local frequencies, regarding global frequencies as
constant. Direct calculation leads to
˙ qijj =
˙ xij
xj
=
2
k + 1
[
δij + (k ¡ 1)
(∑
l
qijlqljj
)
¡ kqijj
]
. (25)
From this, we obtain the steady state of local frequencies as
qijj =
(k ¡ 2)xi + δij
k ¡ 1
. (26)
As before, let us derive the dynamics of xi. Consider an elementary step of IM
updating. The number of i-strategists increases by one when (i) an (j;k1,¢¢¢,kn)-player
11(j 6= i) is chosen for updating and (ii) he imitates one of his i-neighbors. The ﬁrst event
occurs with probability
xj ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1jj ¢¢¢q
kn
njj
)
. (27)
The second event occurs with probability
kiWijj
W(j;k1,¢¢¢,kn) +
∑
l klWljj
. (28)
The number of i-strategists decreases by one, when (i) an (i;k1,¢¢¢,kn)-player is
chosen for updating and (ii) he imitates one of his neighbors not using strategy i. The ﬁrst
event occurs with probability
xi ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1ji ¢¢¢q
kn
nji
)
. (29)
The second event occurs with probability
1 ¡
W(i;k1,¢¢¢,kn) + kiWiji
W(i;k1,¢¢¢,kn) +
∑
l klWlji
. (30)
From these calculations we obtain
˙ xi =
∑
k1+¢¢¢+kn=k
j6=i
xj ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1jj ¢¢¢q
kn
njj
)
¢
kiWijj
W(j;k1,¢¢¢,kn) +
∑
l klWljj
¡
∑
k1+¢¢¢+kn=k
xi ¢
(
k!
k1!¢¢¢kn!
q
k1
1ji ¢¢¢q
kn
nji
)
¢
(
1 ¡
W(i;k1,¢¢¢,kn) + kiWiji
W(i;k1,¢¢¢,kn) +
∑
l klWlji
)
¼ w
k(k + 3)(k ¡ 2)2
(k + 1)2(k ¡ 1)
¢ xi(fi + gi ¡ φ).
(31)
We have
fi =
∑
j
xjaij
φ =
∑
i
xifi =
∑
i,j
xixjaij
gi =
∑
j
xjbij
bij =
(k + 3)aii + 3aij ¡ 3aji ¡ (k + 3)ajj
(k + 3)(k ¡ 2)
.
(32)
Neglecting the constant factor yields the replicator equation for games on graphs using IM
updating,
˙ xi = xi(fi + gi ¡ φ). (33)
125. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Consider a Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Rapoport & Chammah 1965, Trivers 1971, Axelrod
& Hamilton 1981) . A cooperator pays a cost c for his opponent to receive a beneﬁt b. We
assume b > c. A defector pays nothing. The payoﬀ matrix of this game is given by


C D
C b ¡ c ¡c
D b 0

 (34)
Defection, D, dominates cooperation, C. Defection is a strict Nash equilibrium. The
traditional replicator equation of a well-mixed population is given by
˙ x = x(1 ¡ x)(¡c). (35)
Here x represents the frequency (=relative abundance) of cooperators in the population.
Equation (35) has two ﬁxed points: (i) at x = 1 there is an unstable equilibrium where
everybody cooperates; at x = 0 there is a stable equilibrium where everybody defects.
Therefore x = 0 is the global attractor of these dynamics. Hence, evolutionary game
theory predicts the victory of defectors in well-mixed populations.
The game dynamics can drastically change if we consider a structured population.
The replicator equation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on a graph of degree k for the three
diﬀerent update rules is given by
BD: ˙ x = x(1 ¡ x)
k
k ¡ 2
(¡c)
DB: ˙ x = x(1 ¡ x)
k
(k + 1)(k ¡ 2)
(b ¡ kc)
IM: ˙ x = x(1 ¡ x)
k
(k + 3)(k ¡ 2)
fb ¡ (k + 2)cg.
(36)
For BD updating, defectors always win over cooperators as in well-mixed populations.
For DB updating, however, if b/c > k, then cooperators win over defectors. Similarly,
for IM updating, cooperators win over defectors if b/c > k + 2. We note that these
conditions are identical to those derived by Ohtsuki et al. (2006), when analyzing the
13ﬁxation probabilities of cooperators and defectors on graphs. For DB updating, natural
selection favors cooperators over defectors if the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio of the altruistic act
exceeds the degree of the graph, k (which denotes the number of neighbors of any one
individual). Smaller connectivity, k, favors cooperators because then clustering is easier.
Interestingly, Ohtsuki et al (2006) observe that the conditions b/c > k and b/c > k+2 also
hold in numerical simulations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on degree heterogeneous (=non-
regular graphs) such as random graphs and scale free networks. In this case, the parameter
k denotes the average number of neighbors per individual. Therefore, we conjecture that
the replicator equation on graphs (eq 4) will also extend to many non-regular graphs, but
we cannot prove this at present.
DB and IM updating can also predict a couple of interesting phenomena for the
general Prisoner’s Dilemma game given by the payoﬀ matrix


C D
C R S
D T P

. (37)
The game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma if T > R > P > S. As a speciﬁc example, let us
consider


C D
C 5 0
D 8 1

. (38)
If this game is played on a graph with degree k = 3, then the corresponding replicator
dynamics for DB updating is given by
˙ x = x(1 ¡ x)(¡2x + 1), (39)
There is a stable equilibrium at x¤ = 1/2. Therefore, in this example, unconditional
cooperators and defectors can coexist.
As another example consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma given by the payoﬀ matrix


C D
C 15 0
D 16 8

. (40)
14The replicator equation of this game for DB updating and weak selection on a regular
graph with k = 3 is given by
˙ x = x(1 ¡ x)(7x ¡ 5). (41)
There is an unstable equilibrium at x¤ = 5/7. Hence, the system exhibits bistability
between cooperation and defection.
6. The Snow-drift game
Consider a snow-drift game. Two drivers are trapped on either side of a snowdrift in a
blizzard. Cooperation means to get out of the car and shovel. Defection means to relax,
remain in the car and let the other one do the work. If either one of them cooperates, then
both gain the beneﬁt of getting home, b. The cost of removing the snowdrift is c. If both
drivers shovel (cooperate), then the cost for each of them is c/2. It is assumed that b > c.
The payoﬀ matrix of this game is given by


C D
C b ¡ c
2 b ¡ c
D b 0

. (42)
Let x denote the frequency of cooperators. The traditional replicator equation
describing a well-mixed population leads to stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors
at ˆ x = 1 ¡ r, where r = c/(2b ¡ c).
For DB and IM updating on a regular graph of degree k ¸ 3, we ﬁnd that the
equilibrium frequency of cooperators, x¤, is always greater than ˆ x. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that x¤ = 1 if b/c > (k2 +1)/(2k +2) for DB updating and if b/c > (k2 +2k +3)/(2k +6)
for IM updating. Therefore, spatial eﬀects (graph selection) always favors cooperators for
these two update rules.
For BD updating, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium frequency of cooperators is greater
than in the well-mixed case, x¤ > ˆ x, if b/c > 3/2. Remarkably, this condition does not
depend on the degree of the graph. (but remember that all our results are derived for
k ¸ 3). In addition, for BD updating some parameter choices lead to dominance of one
strategy over the other. If b/c > (k+1)/2 then x¤ = 1, which means that defectors become
extinct. If b/c < (2k ¡ 1)/(2k ¡ 2) then x¤ = 0, which means that cooperators become
extinct.
15Hauert & Doebeli (2004) have studied the eﬀect of spatial structure on the snow-
drift game. One of their update rules is equivalent to our PC updating and therefore
similar to BD updating in our analysis (see Appendix). Based on numerical simulations,
Hauert & Doebeli (2004) make the interesting observation that spatial structure can inhibit
cooperation in the snow-drift game. This ﬁnding is in qualitative agreement with our result
for BD updating: if b/c < 3/2 then the equilibrium frequency of cooperators on a regular
graph of (small) degree k is less than the equilibrium frequency of cooperators in a well-
mixed population. A quantitative comparison is diﬃcult, however, because Hauert &
Doebeli did not study the case of weak selection. Our prediction is that for weak selection
and DB or IM updating, spatial structure always favors cooperators in the snow-drift game.
7. Pareto-eﬃciency versus risk-dominance in a coordination game
Consider the payoﬀ matrix


A B
A a b
B c d

. (43)
If a > c and d > b then both strategies A and B are strict Nash equilibria. In this case,
the game is called a ‘coordination game’. It is best to do the same as the opponent;
hence, both players want to coordinate their actions. But should they play A or B? If
a + b < c + d, then strategy B is called risk-dominant (Harsanyi & Selten 1988). In the
standard replicator equation describing a well-mixed population, the basin of attraction
of B is then greater than 1/2. It could be, however, that a > d, in which case strategy A
is called pareto-eﬃcient. For both players, the best outcome is that both choose strategy
A, but the risk of receiving a low payoﬀ is minimized by choosing strategy B. This is an
interesting dilemma. How does population structure aﬀect the evolutionary dynamics of
such a game?
Let us consider the speciﬁc coordination game given by the payoﬀ matrix


A B
A a 0
B 1 2

. (44)
Let us assume that the parameter a satisﬁes 1 < a < 3. Therefore, both strategies A and
B are strict Nash equilibria, but B is always risk dominant over A. If a < 2 then B is both
16risk-dominant and Pareto eﬃcient. If, however, a > 2 then an interesting conﬂict arises,
because strategy A is pareto-eﬃcient, while strategy B is risk-dominant.
First we study the replicator dynamics of this game in a well-mixed population. Let
x denote the frequency of strategy A. There is an unstable equilibrium at x¤ = 2/(1 + a).
As illustrated in Fig 2a, the system is bistable: if the initial fraction of A is greater than
x¤, then strategy A will take over the whole population; if the initial fraction of A is less
than x¤, then strategy B will take over the whole population. As we see in Fig 2a, strategy
B always has the larger basin of attraction.
Let us now consider this coordination game on a graph. For BD updating, the basin
of attraction of strategy B is always larger than in a well-mixed population. Therefore,
BD updating favors risk dominance. For DB updating, if a > (3k + 1)/(k + 1) then
strategy A has the larger basin of attraction. For IM updating, the equivalent condition is
a > (3k + 7)/(k + 3). Since k ¸ 3 both conditions imply that a > 2, which means that A
is Pareto eﬃcient. Therefore, DB and IM updating of game dynamics on graphs can favor
Pareto eﬃciency over risk dominance (Fig 2). See Ohtsuki & Nowak (2006) for similar
results on the cycle (k = 2).
8. The Rock-Scissors-Paper game
Let us consider the rock-scissors-paper game (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998). This game has
three pure strategies, R1, R2 and R3. In a pairwise matching, R1 is defeated by R2, R2 is
defeated by R3, and R3 is defeated by R1. As an example, we study the rock-scissors-paper
game with the payoﬀ matrix




R1 R2 R3
R1 0 1 4
R2 1 4 0
R3 ¡1 6 2



. (45)
Figure 3a shows the phase portrait of the replicator equation of this game in a well-
mixed population. Each vertex of the simplex is an unstable equilbrium corresponding to a
monomorphic population. There is an unstable equilibirum in the interior of the simplex.
The Jacobian matrix at this internal equilibrium has three eigenvalues, one of them is
associated with the transversal direction for the simplex S3 and is of no consequence. The
other two eigenvalues form a pair of complex conjugates and determine the stability of the
17equilibrium. For matrix (45), the real part of those two eigenvalues is given by Re[λ] =
1/28 > 0. The fact that this quantity is positive implies that the internal equilibrium is
unstable. All orbits starting from the interior of the simplex ultimately converge to the
heteroclinic cycle at the boundary, which consists of three edges, e1 ! e2, e2 ! e3, and
e3 ! e1. There are oscillations of increasing amplitude, which will eventually result in the
extinction of two of the three strategies (see May & Leonard 1975).
Playing the rock-scissors-paper game on a graph not only changes the position of
the internal equilibrium, but can also aﬀect its stability. Figures 3b-d show the phase
portraits of the replicator equation on a graph of degree k = 3 for BD (b), DB (c) and
IM (d) updating, respectively. The real part of the two essential eigenvalues of Jacobian
matrix at the internal equilibrium is
BD: Re[λ] =
1
30
DB: Re[λ] = ¡
2
39
< 0
IM: Re[λ] = ¡
12
475
< 0.
(46)
For DB and IM updating, this suggests that the internal equilibirum is stable and hence is
the global attractor of the dynamics. We observe that DB updating stabilizes the internal
equilbrium more than IM updating. In contrast, BD updating does not change the stability
of the internal equilibrium in this example.
9. Discussion
Evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed population can be described by the replicator
equation,
˙ xi = xi[
n ∑
j=1
xjaij ¡ φ]. (47)
Here xi denotes the frequency of strategy i, the quantities aij denote the payoﬀ for strategy
i versus strategy j and φ =
∑
ij aijxixj is the average payoﬀ in the population.
Evolutionary game dynamics on a regular graph of degree k in the limit of weak
selection (w ¿ 1) can be described by the ‘replicator equation on graphs’,
˙ xi = xi[
n ∑
j=1
xj(aij + bij) ¡ φ]. (48)
18For the three diﬀerent update rules, birth-death (BD), death-birth (DB) and imitation
(IM), the coeﬃcients of the B matrix are given by
BD: bij =
aii + aij ¡ aji ¡ ajj
k ¡ 2
DB: bij =
(k + 1)aii + aij ¡ aji ¡ (k + 1)ajj
(k + 1)(k ¡ 2)
IM: bij =
(k + 3)aii + 3aij ¡ 3aji ¡ (k + 3)ajj
(k + 3)(k ¡ 2)
(49)
Therefore, moving a game from a well-mixed population onto a regular graph preserves
the structure of the replicator equation and only results in a transformation of the payoﬀ
matrix
[aij] ! [aij + bij]. (50)
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Appendix: Pairwise comparison (PC) updating
For PC updating, a random individual is chosen for updating its strategy. Then it chooses a
random neighbor. The ﬁrst player adopts the neighbor’s strategy with probability 1/(1 +
exp[¡w∆P]) where the payoﬀ diﬀerence is ∆P = P2 ¡ P1. Here w works as inverse
temperature in statistical physics (Szab´ o & T˝ oke 1998, Hauert & Szab´ o 2005, Traulsen et
al 2006bc). Unlike the three updating rules in the main text, w can be any non-negative
real number here. As w ! 1, PC updating becomes deterministic: an updating player
always imitates the neighbor with a higher payoﬀ but never imitates the neighbor with a
lower score. This is called imitate the better rule (Hofbauer & Sigmund 2003). In contrast,
here we assume weak selection w ¿ 1.
First we derive the steady state of local frequencies, regarding global frequencies as
constant. We obtain
˙ qijj =
˙ xij
xj
=
1
k
[
δij + (k ¡ 1)
(∑
l
qijlqljj
)
¡ kqijj
]
. (A.1)
From this, we obtain
qijj =
(k ¡ 2)xi + δij
k ¡ 1
. (A.2)
Let us derive the dynamics of xi. Consider one elementary step of PC updating.
The number of i-strategists increases by one, when a j-player is chosen for adopting the
strategy of an i-neighbor (where j 6= i). This event occurs with probability
xj ¢ qijj ¢
(
1 + exp
[
¡ (Wijj ¡ Wjji)
])¡1
. (A.3)
On the other hand, the number of i-strategists decreases by one, when an i-player is chosen
to adopt the strategy of a j neighbor (where j 6= i). This event occurs with probability
xi ¢ qjji ¢
(
1 + exp
[
¡ (Wjji ¡ Wijj)
])¡1
. (A.4)
24From these calculations we obtain
˙ xi =
∑
j6=i
xj ¢ qijj ¢
(
1 + exp
[
¡ (Wijj ¡ Wjji)
])¡1
¡
∑
j6=i
xi ¢ qjji ¢
(
1 + exp
[
¡ (Wjji ¡ Wijj)
])¡1
¼ w
(k ¡ 2)2
2(k ¡ 1)
¢ xi(fi + gi ¡ φ).
(A.5)
We have
fi =
∑
j
xjaij
φ =
∑
i
xifi =
∑
i,j
xixjaij
gi =
∑
j
xjbij
bij =
aii + aij ¡ aji ¡ ajj
k ¡ 2
.
(A.6)
Neglecting the constant factor yields the replicator equation for games on graphs,
˙ xi = xi(fi + gi ¡ φ). (A.7)
Note that this equation is exactly the same as for BD updating.
Figure Legends
Figure 1 : Four diﬀerent update rules are studied in this paper. (a) Birth-death (BD)
updating. A player is chosen for reproduction from the entire population proportional
to ﬁtness. The oﬀspring replaces a randomly chosen neighbor. (b) Death-birth (DB)
updating. A random player is chosen to die. The neighbors compete for the empty site
proportional to their ﬁtness. (c) Imitation (IM) updating. A random player is chosen
for updating his strategy. The player keeps his current strategy or imitates one of the
neighbors’ strategies proportional to ﬁtness. (d) Pairwise comparison (PC) updating.
A random player is chosen for updating his strategy. One of the neighbors is chosen at
random. The ﬁrst player either keeps his current strategy or adopts the neighbor’s strategy
with a probability that depends on the payoﬀ diﬀerence. Random choices are shown in
dark blue. Choices that are proportional to ﬁtness are shown in red. BD and PC updating
25(yellow background) lead to identical evolutionary dynamics in our present analysis. DB
and IM updating (light blue background) have similar behavior.
Figure 2 : Replicator dynamics of a coordination game in a well-mixed population (a) or
on a regular graph of degree k = 3,4 or 5 for three diﬀerent update rules (b-d). The payoﬀ
matrix for the two strategies A and B is given by eq (44). Both strategies are strict Nash
equilibria. The horizontal axes represent the parameter a. For 1 < a < 2, strategy B is
both risk-dominant and Pareto eﬃcient. For 2 < a < 3, strategy A is Pareto eﬃcient, while
strategy B is still risk-dominant. The solid line in each ﬁgure shows the boundary between
the two basins of attraction. The broken line indicates the point where both basins are
equally large (1/2). (a) In a well-mixed population, strategy B always has the larger basin
of attraction. (b) For BD updating, the basin of attraction of strategy B is even larger
than in a well-mixed population. BD updating favors risk-dominance. (c,d) For DB and
IM updating, if a is close to 3, then strategy A has the larger basin of attraction. Hence,
DB and IM updating can favor pareto-eﬃciency over risk dominance.
Figure 3 : The replicator dynamics of the rock-scissors-paper game (eq 45) for a well-
mixed population (a), or played on graphs with degree k = 3 for BD, DB and IM up-
dating (b-d). Each panel shows the simplex S3. Each corner point, ei, corresponds to
the monomorphic population where only strategy Ri is present. Open and solid circles in
ﬁgures represent unstable and stable equilibria respectively. For the well-mixed population
(a) and for BD updating (b), the internal equilibrium is unstable; all orbits converge to
the heteroclinic cycle at the boundary. But for DB updating (c) and IM updating (d), the
internal equilibrium is stable and becomes the global attractor of the dynamics.
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